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Court of International Trade in matters relating to antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations. Currently the Federal
Circuit "applies anew" the standard of review the CIT applied in
its review. This results in a duplication of effort by the CAFC with
no explicit deference to the CIT. In Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United
States", the Federal Circuit criticized this practice. Chief Judge
Carman has furthered this criticism by reminding the Federal
Circuit that the work it does in reviewing anew the entire
administrative record is burdensome and time-consuming on a
court that has more experience and a heavier docket.
I agree with that assessment that Chief Judge Carman makes
as to the need for that new standard of review. I agree that the
current standard used by the Federal Circuit is unduly
burdensome, and that "applying anew" delays not only timesensitive decisions in international trade matters, but also
indirectly delays decisions on patent cases. My agreement with a
call for a new standard is not only to minimize the delay and
burden on the Federal Circuit, however. My agreement with a call
for a new standard arises from my respect for the collective
expertise in international trade matters that the judges of the U.S.
Court of International Trade have developed over the past two
This collective expertise is deserving of greater
decades.
deference. It should still be subject to review of course, but the
review should recognize that the CIT judges have a special
expertise in reviewing the specialized agencies, and that we will
all be better off if we recognize the value of that expertise.
D. Future Lectures
We here at the John Marshall Law School look forward to the
opportunity to hold further lectures in this new Judge Dominick L.
DiCarlo Court of International Trade Lecture Series. We believe
that a sustained academic concentration on the specialized work of
the Court of International Trade will inure to the benefit of the
Court, litigants who appear before the Court, and, indeed, any
consumer of an imported product.
CHIEF JUDGE CARMAN:
A

SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW THAT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPLIES TO APPEALS OF ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES FOR THE U.S. COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to begin by familiarizing
17.

99 F.3d 1576 (CAFC 1996).
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you with the United States Court of International Trade. Many of
its decisions, unlike numerous other litigated matters, affect
virtually every citizen in the United States. The International
Trade Court, although remarkably little known by many
practitioners, has significant national and international impact
involving billions of international trade dollars.
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to levy and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. 18 It requires all such
duties, imposts, and excises to be "uniform throughout the United
States." 9 And in exercising these powers, Congress created the
United States Court of International Trade.
Today, the United States Court of International Trade is the
only national trial court established under Article III of the
Constitution.0
The court consists of nine judges who are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.2' We currently have eight judges who are active and three
senior judges.
The Court of International Trade, known as the CIT,
possesses all of the legal and equitable powers of the United States
District Courts.2 The CIT's jurisdiction encompasses civil suits
arising from numerous types of actions by agencies as a result of
import transactions, but not export transactions. The Court of
International Trade has authority over classifying and valuating
merchandise, charging duties and fees on imported merchandise,
excluding merchandise from entry under provisions of the customs
laws, liquidating entries, refusing to pay drawback, and challenges
to antidnmping and countervailing duty decisions. In addition,
the CIT has jurisdiction to review the denial, revocation or
suspension of a custom broker's license, determinations of
eligibility for trade adjustments under the Trade Act of 1974,
penalty cases and foreign trade zone matters.
Now, I would like to talk about a specific area of the law that
is still unsettled and changing in the world of international trade.
This unsettled area of law is the standard of review that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applies
when it reviews CIT decisions in anti-dumping and countervailing
duty cases.
Let me begin by explaining what dumping is all about.
Dumping occurs when a foreign company imports a product into
the United States and sells it at a lower price than it sells for in
other countries. For example, a foreign company may import a
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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television set from Japan where it sells for $500, and sell it here in
the United States for $250. There is a dumping margin of $250,
and that is on the low end. Usually dumping cases involve huge
sums of money.
At the Court of International Trade, we review the
administrative records from investigations conducted by the
International Trade Administration of the United States
Department of Commerce (ITA) and the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) to determine whether or
not dumping is taking place. We review these cases on a specific
standard called "by substantial evidence or otherwise in
accordance with the law," which Congress mandated in the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.23 The CIT's decision can then be appealed
to the Federal Circuit.
Unfortunately, the 1979 Act did not provide any guidance on
the standard of review to be applied by the Federal Circuit Court
when reviewing CIT decisions. In the absence of explicit statutory
guidance, the Appellate Court continued to apply the combination
de novo/deference standard that had historically governed its
review of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. However, in
1984, the standard changed.
In Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. the United States,24 the Federal
Circuit articulated the "apply anew" standard, which currently
governs antidumping and countervailing duty cases. In that case,
the Federal Circuit announced that it would review agency
decisions "by applying anew" the standard of review outlined in
the Trade Agreements Act.25
As a result, the Court of
International Trade extensively reviews the record and determines
whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Then the Federal Circuit applies the same standard of review,
duplicating what we are doing at the Court of International Trade.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied this standard
consistently for almost ten years following its issuance until 1994,
when a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit questioned the
propriety of the standard.
In Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. vs. United States,26 the Federal Circuit
announced that it would review anew the agency determination,
but also stated that it would not ignore the informed opinion of the
United States Court of International Trade. Moreover, after
reviewing the record in considerable detail, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the CIT's decision deserved due respect. 7 So what
happened was in Suramerica was that instead of applying "anew"
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1559 n.10.
44 F.3d 978, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 988.
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the statutory standard of review, the Federal Circuit gave the CIT
decision considerable deference.
In its opinion, the Suramerica court questioned the Atlantic
Sugar decision in three respects. First, the Court first noted that
the Atlantic Sugar decision did not cite any legal authority when it
announced the "apply anew" standard. 8
Second, the Suramerica court stated that Atlantic Sugar
appeared to rely on the belief that the 1979 Trade Agreements Act
prescribes the Federal Circuit's standard of review. 9
The
Suramerica court noted, however, that the 1979 Act "does not
support that proposition." 0 Instead, "the court" to which the
statute referred was the United States Court of International
Trade.31 The statute was silent on what standard the Federal
Circuit should apply to review a decision of the Court of
International Trade. 2
Third, the Suramerica panel suggested the standard of review
that the Federal Circuit should apply is the one outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp v.
NLRB. 3 In that case, the Supreme Court held that whether on
the record as a whole, there was substantial evidence to support
agency findings, is a question which Congress has placed in the
keeping of the court reviewing the agency determination." The
Court limited further review only to the rare instances where the
lower court misapprehended or grossly misapplied the statutory
35
standard of review.
The Suramerica court concluded by stating that "if in a future
appeal, this court were offered the opportunity to reconsider the
Atlantic Sugar rule en banc, this Court might better consider only
whether the Court of International Trade
misapprehended or
30 6
grossly misapplied the statutory standard."
It is my suggestion to you today that the Federal Circuit
needs to abandon the "apply anew" standard of review and instead
adopt the "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" standard
37
contemplated in Suramerica.
There are several problems with the Federal Circuit's
28. Id. at 982 n.1.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
Id.

36. Suramerica, 44 F.3d at 982 n.1.
37. This suggestion has also been made in Gregory W. Carman, A Critical
Analysis of the Standard of Review Applied by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 17 ST.

JOHN'S. J.L. COMM. 177, 179, 198 (2003).
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standard of review in trade cases. First, no federal statute
requires the "apply anew" standard. There is nothing in the
statute obligating the Federal Circuit to apply the standard, nor
does the legislative history support this interpretation.
Another problem with the "apply anew" standard of review is
that it duplicates the review conducted by the Court of
International Trade and contradicts the Congressional intent
behind the 1979 Act. The standard of review set forth in the 1979
Act, applicable to the Court of International Trade, was enacted by
Congress to "provide an expedited process for judicial review, and
shorten the time limits for obtaining review of an appealable
determination."38 Congress noted that the statute "amends the
present law to eliminate de novo review of determinations or
assessments made pursuant to the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws," and that "[t]he present standard of de
novo review is both time-consuming and duplicative." 9
I would like you to think of it in this way. The United States
Court of International Trade examines these proceedings, going
through extensive records, and determining where the records
have substantial evidence to support them. In some cases, the
records are not complete and the Court spends considerable
amounts of time compiling the record. Indeed, it is not uncommon
for the Court of International Trade to remand some cases back to
the administrative agencies to get additional explanation and
evidence to support their position. When the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit applies the same standard, there is an
unnecessary expenditure of time, increased costs and lost
opportunities.
Is this an ego trip for the people in the Court of International
Trade? No, the answer is no. It is a complaint that this is costing
time and it is costing money. The Federal Circuit itself has been
critical of this natural outcome of the redundant standard of
review, noting that "replication of the record review already
performed effectively renders the Court of International Trade's
review superfluous.' 0 The Federal Circuit also stated that its
"apply anew" standard of review adds "unnecessary time and
expense to the appeal process. It undercuts the benefit this court
derives from the experience and expertise of the Court of
International Trade.

'

The statistics punctuate this criticism. From 1984, when the
38. H.R. REP. NO. 96-317, at 180-81 (1979).
39. Id.
40. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 99 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (Rader, J., concurring).
41. Id. See also Kevin Casey, Jade Camara, & Nancy Wright, Standards of
Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED.

CIR.B.J. 279, 351 (1981).
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Federal Circuit announced its "apply anew" standard, through
2000, it has heard an average of fifty-two appeals a year from the
Court of International Trade.42 That number increased to 160 in
2001, an increase of more than 150 percent.43 The increase in the
number of trade cases filed with the Federal Circuit will certainly
have an adverse impact on the time necessary to review them.
From 1996 through the year 2000, the average length of time
between date of docketing and the date of disposition for cases
appealed from the Court of International Trade was approximately
fourteen months." That time will surely increase as the Federal
Circuit reviews the record of every case on appeal from the Court
of International Trade.
A further complication is that the Federal Circuit does not
consistently apply the standard of review. In some cases, the
Federal Circuit will strictly apply anew the statutory standard of
review, and in others, the Federal Circuit will defer to the CIT's
decision without extensively reviewing the record. As a result, it
is terribly frustrating for the lawyers who are going up before
them. I think it must be impossible to know what this person
should argue.
It seems to me that the Federal Circuit is saying one thing
and doing another. They are saying that the "apply anew"
standard of review applies, but in all fairness, I do not believe that
they have the time to delve into those records the way that the
Court of International Trade does.
This is a significant legal issue whose time has come for
change. You here at The John Marshall Law School have helped
me to present that again on a national level, and I thank you for
that opportunity. I want to thank all of you, especially the faculty
for the wonderful hospitality they have extended to me. I also
want to thank all of you, the students, for the warm welcome you
have given me. It has been a wonderful honor for me to speak at
the Inaugural Judge Dominick DiCarlo United States Court of
International Trade Lecture. Thank you for having me.

42. Memorandum from Edward W. Hosken, Jr., Chief Deputy Clerk for
Administration for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to Leo
Gordon, Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of International Trade (Mar. 27,

2002).
43. Id.
44. Id.

